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RECENT CASE NOTES

discussion and consideration, it is confidently expectfed that a plan will be
evolved for a more permanent type of union between the different classes of
bar organizations.
WILL SHAFROTH,

Assistant to the President.

RECENT CASE NOTES
Banks and Trust Cornpanies-Insolvency--Preferred Claims. Petition
for allowance of claim against insolvent trust company as preferred. Under
a written trust agreement, executed on April 16, 1931, Katherine D. Vajen
transferred $7,527.88 cash in bank and certain securities to the Farmers
Trust Company as trustees for herself. On May 21, 1931, Appellee Boyd
M. Ralston was appointed receiver of the Farmers Trust Company. Subsequently, the appellant, The Union Trust Company, was appointed trustee
under the trust agreement, as successor to the Farmers Trust Company.
The receiver turned over to the appellant trustee all the securities belonging
to said trust, but did not turn over the uninvested funds belonging to the
trust, which, at the time of his appointment as such receiver, amounted to
$8,971.34. There had been commingled with the general funds of the insolvent trust company and at the time of the appointment of the receiver
the general fund had been reduced to $4,909.14. Appellant filed its verified
petition for allowance of a preferred claim in the sum of $8,971.34 against
the general assets of the Farmers Trust Company. The trial court allowed
the appellant's claim in the sum of $8,971.34 as a preferred claim against the
$4,909.14 in the general fund, but the balance not paid out of the general
fund was allowed as a general claim only. Appellant appealed from the
overruling of motions for a new trial and to modify said judgment. Held:
Chapter 167 of the Acts of 1931 governs appellant's claim. Trial court
instructed to render judgment allowing appellant's claim against appellee in
the sum of $8,971.34 as preferred against all the gineral assets of the
Farmers Trust Company.'
Under the law of trusts the trustee has no right to commingle the trust
fund with funds of his own.2 However, in a case where there has been
an unauthorized commingling of trust funds with those of the trustee the
remedies offered the cestui que trust upon the insolvency of the trustee have
varied. At one time money which a trust company had received as guardian
and commingled with its common fund was not entitled to preference in
Indiana, though the amount received by the trust company as guardian could
be traced into the common fund of said trust company. The claim allowed
in such case was only a general one. 3 Today, in case of commingling, the
majority rule is that the cestui que trust may trace the trust res or its
proceeds, whether such be in the hands of the trustee or in the hands of a
purchaser or transferee with notice; and in case of insolvency of the trustee
the cestui que trust has a preferred claim upon any fund into which he
traces the res or its proceeds if he is able to pr6ve that the funds commingled with the general fund "swelled" or augmented the funds in such
1 Union

Trust Company v. Ralston (1934), 191 N. E. 94.

2 Morgan v. State (1924), 162 Ark. 34, 257 S. W. 364; Iowa Mut. Liability Ins.

Co. v. De La Hunt (1923), 197 Iowa 227, 196 N. W. 17; Franklin Say. & Trust Co. v.
Clark (1925), 283 Pa. 212, 129 Atl. 56; Fogg v. Tyler (1912), 109 Me. 109, 32 Ati.
1008.
3 Wainwright Trust Co. v. Dulin (1918), 67 Ind. 476, 119 N. E. 387.
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general fund.4 This rule has allowed a preference to the cestui when he
traced his funds into a general fund which has been augmented thereby;
and the preference, or lien against the general fund, has been held good
against the entire fund through the commingled fund may have become so
depleted that its sum did not total the amount of the preferred claim.5
In case the commingled sum does not equal the preferred claim any balance
remaining is a general claim against the other assets of the trustee. If, however, the cestui can only trace his funds to the assets of the trustee, and
into no particular fund his claim against the commingling trustee is only a
general one. The cestui must be able to trace the res or its proceeds into a
certain and specific fund; and upon his failing to do so no preference is
allowed; the claim remains a general one. 6 The burden of tracing into a
specific fund is always on the one claiming preference, and if he is able to
trace the trust res or its proceeds only to the assets of the trustee, and not
to a specific fund, his claim has no preference. 7
The holding of the principal case is in compliance with legislative enactment, and is not a reversal of Indiana's long compliance with the majority
rule. Chapter 167, p. 580, of the Acts of the General Assembly of Indiana
for the year 1931, which governs appellant's claim in the principal case
reads as follows:
"An Act concerning funds held by a bank or trust company in trust or
fiduciary capacity.
Insolvent Banks and Trust Companies Acting as Fiduciaries-Priority of
Claims of Beneficiaries.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of
Indiana, That hereafter, upon the insolvency, suspension or liquidation of
any bank of discount and deposit, or loan and trust and safe deposit company, while acting as executor, administrator, receiver, guardian, assignee,
commissioner, agent, attorney-in-fact, or in any other fiduciary capacity, the
person or persons beneficially entitled to receive the property and the proceeds held in trust by it as aforesaid, or its successors in trust, shall have
preference and priority over its general creditors in all assets of such bank
or loan and trust and safe deposit company, for all uninvested funds so held
in trust to the extent of any commingling with its general assets or which
may not be duly accounted for." 8 By a fair interpretation of this statute, 9
4 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott (1932), 94 Ind. App. 461, 181 N. E. 369;
Shopert v. Ind. Nat. Bank (1908), 41 Ind. App. 474, 83 N. E. 515; Pearce v. Dill
(1897), 149 Ind. 136, 48 N. E. 788; Windstanley et al. v. Second Nat. Bank of Louisville (1895), 13 Ind. App. 544, 41 N. E. 956; Bevis v. Heflin (1878), 63 Ind. 129;
Barnett, etc. v. Kulmer, etc. (1934), 190 N. E. 364; McEwen v. Davis, Rec. (1885),
103 Ind. 526, 5 N. E. 911; Lamb, Rec. v. Morres (1888), 11 Ind. 174, 20 N. E. 746;
Porter v. Roseman (1905), 165 Ind. 255, 74 N. E. 1105; People v. California Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. (1917), 175 Cal. 756, 167 Pac. 388; Miller v. Anderson (1928),
221 N. W. 543.
5 Meyers v. Matiusek (1929), 98 Fla. 1126, 125 So. 360.
6 Allen Steen Acceptance Co. v. Cook, Rec. (1932), 93 Ind. App. 682, 173 N. E.
460; Rottger v. First Merchants' Nat. Bank of Lafayette (1933), 184 N. E. 276;
Lebanon Trust & Safe Deposit Bank's Assigned Estate (1895), 166 Pa. 622, 31 At. 334.
7 Frederick Iron & Steel Co. v. Page (1923), 166 Atl. 738; Terre Haute Trust Co.
v. Scott (1932), 94 Ind. App. 461, 181 N. E. 369. (Relieves the cestui of his tracing

burden in that the trust company's method of keeping record of cash transaction in
connection with the trust cannot jeopardize beneficiary's rights.)
8 Changed by Chapter 40 of the Acts of 1933. This act as set out in Burns' 1933,
18-1210, p. 259, is substantially the same as Chapter 167 of the Acts of 1931, and is as
follows: "Upon the liquidation of any bank or trust company while it is acting as
attorney-in-fact, agent, custodian, guardian, trustee, receiver, administrator, executor,

commissioner, assignee or in any other fiduciary capacity, the person or persons beneficially entitled to receive property or proceeds thereof held by it, or any successor
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it is clear that the legislative intent was to grant a uniform remedy to all
beneficiaries whose rights under a fiduciary or trust relationship had been
breached by a bank or trust company. Formerly, as seen by the majority
rule which has been the law in Indiana, the remedy offered a beneficiary
against a commingling trustee depended upon the beneficiary's ability to trace
the trust res or its proceeds into a certain asset of the trustee. Under the
principal decision the beneficiary's remedy against the commingling trustee
will no longer waver between a general or preferred claim according to the
beneficiary's ability so to trace. The present Indiana rule, as set out in the
principal case may then be stated as follows: All beneficiaries entitled to uninvested funds in the hands of a bank or trust company acting as a trustee,
which funds have been commingled with the funds of the trustee, have
upon the insolvency of said trustee, a preferred claim against all the assets
of such trustee.
The granting of a preferred claim over all the assets of a commingling
trustee to the beneficiary of a trust has been accomplished in certain instances without the provisions of a statute. One of such instances is where
the insolvent trustee held funds for the benefit of the state. In such cases,
if the commingled fund does not equal the amount of the state's claim against
such trustee, the' state obtains a preference over all the trustee's assets. 10
Under Chapter 167 of the Indiana Acts of 1931, any beneficiary under similar
circumstances, is now afforded the remedy once open only to the state. Here,
the court was clearly correct in granting preference to the appellant's claim,
for the statute obviously contemplates a new and more certain remedy for
all beneficiaries who have claims against insolvent banks and trust companies.
R.A.B.

ConstitutionalLaw--Eminent Domain-Public Use.-Action for appointment of appraisers of land for railroad connection. Both parties are corporations engaged in the business of operating stone quarries. Defendant contends that the statute which gives stone quarries the power of eminent domain
for the purpose of constructing a lateral railroad for not more than ten
miles in length to any other railroad or canal is unconstitutional because the
property was to be taken for a private and not a public use. Held, the
development and operation of mines and quarries is of such public interest
and benefit to the state and to the communities in which they are situated
that mining and quarrying may properly be regarded as a public use for
which the power of eminent domain may be delegated for the purpose of
securing a way of necessity. Judgment for plaintiff reversed because the act
in question did not enable the plaintiff to acquire defendant's completed
lateral railroad, which was included in the proposed appropriation.'
No principle of law is better settled than that the legislature can not
grant to a private corporation or individual the power to take private property
for a private use, but it is equally'well settled that the legislature may grant
fiduciary that may be appointed, shall have preference and priority in all assets of
such bank or trust company over its general creditors, for all uninvested money held
by such bank or trust company in its capacity as a fiduciary, to the extent that such
money is commingled with its general assets, or is not duly accounted for."
?Wooley Coal Co. v. Trevault (1918), 187 Ind. 171, 118 N. E. 921; State v. Shanks
(1912), 178 Ind. 330, 99 N. E. 481; State v. Jennings (1872), 27 Ark. 419.
10 State v. Bruce (1909), 17 Idaho 1, 102 Pac. 831; Meyer v. Board of Education
(1893), 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658.
lIndianapolis Oolitic Stone Co. v. Alexander King Stone Co. (1934), 190 N.,-E.

57 (Ind.).

